mattockfs

HIVE-Ads progress report including accounts/github setup, reading up on escrow & little FlureeDB side-chain experiment.

Outline: Rewarding top-content providers with add revenues. A possible first step towards HIVE as second level protocol.

I'm feeling a bit weird writing about an on-hold project. I've prioritized my dev projects and decided to work on only one at a time, and the top of my list is hivequeue, not FAIRDROP. I am writing this

Some of you who have been developing STEEM apps and custom tools for STEEM in Python will know or know about my old projects asyncsteem (python2 + Twisted)and txjsonrpcqueue (Python2+Python3 +

If you are a Python developer and by chance you have been using either the Python 2 asyncsteem library, or the alpha stage Python 2+3 txjsonrpcqueue library, a little heads up. Because of the STEEM blockchain

Bit on the good past. It's been quite a while since I've spent any real time developing for the STEEM platform. Those of you following my alter ego, @pibara might remember @croupierbot. You might remember

With HF21 if you are a minnow or dolphin, up voting a comment on your post will either mean no longer reaching dust level with even a 100% up vote, or if you do reach the dust level, it will likely mean the economic value will only be slightly over half of the value it would have up voting a regular post instead. As such, up voting of comments will become less attractive and as a result, commenting on posts, previously a prime source of slow initial growth for red fish accounts will become less attractive. There is a way around this. Using a [comment-vote accumulator](https://steemit.com/commentrewards/@pibara/using-a-comment-vote-accumulator). Would you consider using a comment-vote accumulator post when commenting on posts? Would you up vote such accumulator posts? Or do you feel using a comment-vote accumulator is a form of abuse and should lead to down votes of people who use them?

SteemSende-EU is still far from ready for usage, but one of the things I am working on is a smallish airdrop for the STEEMSENSE airdrop. The prime goal for STEEMSENSE is to be a token for buying advertising

<center> <img src="http://www.steemsense.eu/steemsense.png" width="50"> </center> I am currently testing with some code for the @steemsense-eu proof of concept. SteemSense-EU is to become a proof of concept for a bid-based revenue sharing STEEM-burning advertising platform for STEEM. The current idea is that STEEM will be the primary currency for the platform for any non-STEEM advertiser. If there is a lack of bids, something that is likely to often be the case during project start-up, the top STEEM/SBD burning *promoted* post for shall receive free auto-generated-banner ad displays for each primary tag. A one [STEEMSENSE](https://steem-engine.com/?p=market&t=STEEMSENSE) a day reward pool shall be set aside to be divided amongst non-advertiser-funded click through facilitators and /or users of the STEEM promoted feature. That is, untill the max supply of 1,000 STEEMSENSE is reached. I've currently made 1% (10 STEEMSENSE) available on [steem-engine](https://steem-engine.com/?p=market&t=STEEMSENSE) in an attempt to maybe get some funding for my project. Mostly to be able to allocate more time to the project and speed things up. I also would like to spent about 1% (10 STEEMSENSE) in an airdrop, mainly to get some attention for the project. What do you think, from a marketing perspective would be the best way to do the one time 10 STEEMSENSE airdrop? And what do you feel is the best way to spent the daily 1 STEEMSENSE reward pool?

I am currently in the planing and experimentation stage of a new proof of concept ad revenue sharing platform for STEEM. The idea is that creating an ad-revenue sharing platform that burns part of the revenue and gives a large part of the revenue to content creators that deliver clicks, could address two STEEM economic issues that aren't in any way addressed by the upcoming HF21 Economic Improvement Proposal (EIP): * The fact that inflation is hurting the STEEM economy and the value of the coin, and only burning STEEM can help reduce inflation. * The fact that STEEM is currently failing to onboard top content creators that could leverage the value of the platform, as it is failing badly to compete with ad revenue sharing platforms for top content creators. The idea for [SteemSense.EU](https://steemit.com/steemsense/@steemsense-eu/steemsense-eu-a-money-supply-burning-ad-revenue-sharing-facility-for-steem) is that we create a bid based ad revenue sharing platform for STEEM where advertisers can create bids on tags using tresholds for account age, account reputation and account vest, using blacklists where appropriate, and if desired bid on specific top content creators individually. Bids would be made with a campaign budget existing of either STEEM or the steem-engine STEEMSENSE token. An idea for revenue sharing could look something like: * 3/6th to the content creator bringing in the clicks. * 2/6th to be burned using the STEEM *promoted* feature for any STEEM hosted click targets. * 1/6th for platform hosting and maintenance. Do you thin, if/when SteemSense.EU goes live, that you will be using it, either for making some extra STEEM and or STEEMSENSE-tokens, or for more exposure of your products end/or content?

In [this post](https://steemit.com/hardfork/@pibara/seven-different-ways-how-hf21-could-backfire), seven possible ways are described how the upcoming hard-fork could potentially backfire. Do you believe that HF21 is going to backfire? And if you believe it will, in what ways?

The STEEM blockchain is ruled by Steemit Inc and top witnesses. Witnesses are voted for by stake holders based on SP, but voting really is fire and forget. Currently a witness vote, once cast remains valid until explicitly removed. In a normal democracy, we need to vote periodically. If you don't vote your vote won't get counted, no matter what you voted for the last time around. If you die, no more voting for you. On the STEEM blockchain though, if you die, or less dramatic, stop caring about the platform or the votes you may have cast in the past, your old vote will remain valid indefinetely no matter what. In society, our leaders are chosen, they get a set amount of time to change things. Then a new election happens where society judges the leaders on what they achieved or failed to achieve the previous period. At each hard fork major changes happen to the block chain for those still involved in the platform. You could say the results of a HF are the subject on what our leadership, the top witnesses, should be judged. As such it can be argued that a hard fork should reset all witness votes, or possibly, initiate a timer for resetting all witness votes. So the question: *Do you think a HF should result in witness votes being reset?* ---

For reasons descibed here, I've just un-delegated 1920 SP that I was delegating from my @pibara account to my @mattockfs account. The upcoming HF21 and its new reward curve make the idea of having two

<center>  </center> With HF21 coming up and talk being the EIP is going to be pushed forward into this HF, the day that, next to some other things I won't talk about in this post, we will get a separate down vote pool in STEEM, and with it as good STEEM citizens, the distributed responsibility of using these free down votes responsible and for the good of the platform. One of the prime problems with the STEEM platform today is false curation. Self up votes, bid bot votes, vote bots that work on delegation basis without even as much as algorithmically evaluating the content quality. Groups of sock puppet accounts circle voting, etc. You could help the platform by manually hunting down abuse and down voting it, or you could delegate your posting role to a DApp that targets specific ways of abuse in a way that would (hopefully) at least partially shield you from retaliation. I am currently doing some tests for just such a DApp. I am not sure yet if I am going to actually build it because I don't know if anyone would actually be interested in using such a service. I hope the results of this poll will help me decide if I am going to build this DApp. The idea for the DApp is as follows: A simple bot runs in the background and gathers info on different types of false curation accounts and account pairs. * bid bots * delegation based up vote bots * self votes * likely automated puppet account circle votes * comment spam Further the bot uses a white list for content based algorithmic curation bots. For users of the DApp, the DApp would offer the option to have your account participate in **false curation attenuation** and/or to use an auto muting service. Both settable for each of the above forms of false curation. The idea is to counter random false curation up votes with a down vote of up to about one third of the total false curation votes done on the post on the last day before pay-out. If possible (if there are enough accounts available to participate) this would be done using small down-votes from a cluster of accounts to do the down-vote, combined with a comment from the main DApp account explaining the purely attenuative nature of the down vote. I hope that the post combined with the cluster down vote would keep the risk of powerful retaliation on individual participants low. A second feature I would like to implement if I end up creating this DApp would be auto mute. The idea is that your key would be used to mute falsely curated accounts (bid bot users, self up voters, etc) up to ten days after the last false curation. So my question: if this DApp gets created and after HF21 we have our separate down-vote pool, would you use use it? If yes, then how? And if no, why not?

I currently have two main STEEM accounts, both holding about 2000 SP worth of voting power. I like up voting people who comment on my post in order to show how much I appreciate feedback on my post, and

If things go as projected, HF21 is going to replace the current linear reward curve (Sn), that replaced an Sn^2 curve with a convergent linear curve ( Sn^2/(Sn+1) ) curve. In [this post](https://steemit.com/hf21/@pibara/a-serious-attempt-at-repairing-the-steem-economic-improvement-proposal-eip-for-hf21) the alternative of an nS^Log(n) is proposed. What reward curve(s) do you feel is/are best for the platform?

The EIP proposal consists of three parts. * A convergent-linear reward curve instead of a linear reward * A much bigger chunk of the reward pool allocated to curators * A separate down-vote pool I've spent quite a few posts discussing the problems with this proposal. A proposal that has the [public support of Steemit Inc](https://steemit.com/steem/@steemitblog/improving-the-economics-of-steem-a-community-proposal), and next to that the support of [a vast majority of the top 20 witnesses](https://steemit.com/dpoll/@cervantes/as-a-top-steem-witness-will-you-support-a-hardfork-implementing-the-economic-improvement-proposal-or-eip). That pretty much means the proposal **will** get implemented. The only question that remains is: when? I could get into all reasons why this proposal is more likely to hurt than to enable the STEEM economy, but if I did I'dd just be repeating myself. So instead I link to my earlier posts and polls: * A [poll asking what actions by passive stake holders are best for the platform](https://dpoll.xyz/detail/@mattockfs/what-action-by-pasive-stake-holders-would-be-best-for-the-steem-platform/) * A [counter proposal in line with the outcome of the poll](https://steemit.com/steem/@pibara/improving-the-economics-of-steem-a-counter-proposal) * Elaboration on [n²/(Sn+1) vs nS^log(n) reward curve](https://steemit.com/utopian-io/@mattockfs/non-lineair-rewards-convergent-linear-vs-fish-size-bonus) * [An idea for fixing the down-vote pool proposal by making down-votes hit curation more](https://steemit.com/eip/@mattockfs/eip-on-fixing-the-broken-down-votes-flags-reputation-system-for-steem) In short, the proposal as is will make it much harder for new accounts to reach minnow status, hindering growth. Will create extra incentive for passive investors to choose delegating to or running bid bots over the less disruptive use of up vote, and generally will disincentify the creation of top content by greatly reducing the part of the reward pool allocated for content creators. There are ways to fix this, as outlined partially in the links above, but as is, the proposal will hinder growth, hit the small guys disproportionally hard, and will allocate more inflation to passive stake holders and less to active content creators than is currently the case. Of the top 20 witnesses, 15 have expressed their full support for the proposal in its current form. 3 (@anyx, thecryptodrive and @themarkymark) have expressed their partial support and only one, @yabapmatt has voted against the proposal in @cervantes's poll. No voters below the top 20 (@drakos 21, @kly 78, @krnel 96 and @pjau 99) are mostly way down in rank and thus the probability that the EIP proposal isn't going to get implemented as is is rather small at the moment. If you are an active content creator about to get hit by the consequences of the upcoming hard fork that will implement these changes, how do you plan to react to to these changes. Check any of the options that you seriously consider. If you are already mostly a passive stake holder and not a content creator, please don't vote

We used to have flags on steemit, now we have down-votes. But nothing has changed, really, they are the same thing. The change though is meant, apparently, to entice users to become more involved in the

At this moment STEEM has linear rewards. Currently Steemit INC is communicating its support for an Economic Improvement Proposal by @trafalgar, and there is talk of moving from linear to convergent linear

 In a discussion I had with @trafalgar , in the comment section of [this post](https://steemit.com/steem/@steemitblog/improving-the-economics-of-steem-a-community-proposal) on the subject of **Improving the Economics of Steem**, an interesting question turned out to be the core of our disagreement. The proposal @trafalgar assumes insentives can be devices to make passive stake holders (those with a lot of SP who can't currently be bothered to do any manual curation) become active curators. In [my counter proposal](https://steemit.com/steem/@pibara/improving-the-economics-of-steem-a-counter-proposal), I assume passive stake holders will remain passive stakeholders regardless of economic incentives. If we for the sake of argument assume that a lot of passive stake holders would at best rather pay someone to write them a script to fit the incentive than actually spent any time curating, my question is, what passive stakeholder behaviour would be most beneficial to the platform Given that any attempt to improve the ecomomic system of the platform, I feel it is of high importance to think about what behaviour we should want this (stakewise) large group of stakeholders to gravitate towards. That is, it is hard enough to find the right measures to incentify behaviour you know you want and discourage behaviour you know you don't want. It is absolutely impossible to do so if you haven't explored the different options passive stake holders have, and have considered which of the available **passive income** options are most beneficial (or least disruptive) to the platform. ### Algoritmic curation While there is no substitute for real curation, algoritmic curation is likely the closest we are going to get stake holders set on settle on. It can be argued that algoritmic curation at least moves funds from the stake oriented sub economy to the content economy, but it also can be argued that algoritmic curation disrupts the content economy with false curation votes. ### Running (or delegating to) bid bots Currently bid-bots are a win/win for both bid bot owners and users. While the ROI on bid bots is approximately 100%, this basically translates to bid bot users getting free advertising (trending) and a free boost to their reputation, while in return the bid bot owner basically gets the same income he would get if he was to spent all his voting strength on self-votes. It can be argued that bid bots provide a valuable service that allow smal accounts to get the spotlight they deserve. It can also be argued that bid bots ruin the trending pages and poison the reputation system. ### Actual self-votes on automated posts A stake holder can just automate making up to ten posts a day and self-up-vote them. It can be argued that this behaviour poisons the content eco system less than the above two options. It can also be argued that as no money actually flows to real content providers and the trending is still affected, that this behaviour actually hurts the platform more. ### Actual self-votes on automated comments on their own posts There is a second way to self-up-vote. As self-up-votes on posts mess with the trending pages and up votes on comments don't, it can be argued that self-up-voting your own comments on your own posts is less disruptive than self-up-voting your own posts themselves. ### Powering down and selling stake One last option we must consider passive stake holders may get incentified for would be powering down and selling their stake. It can be argued that this is good as it reduces the inflation needed to fund the content economy, but then it can also be argued that doing so would drive down the price of STEEM considerably and could even end up destroying the platform by making running a witness node uneconomical. --- Which of the above options do you feel would be most beneficial to the platform passive stakeholders to choose.