You know this.
I know this.
Everyone knows this.
Right?
Even if your keys get stolen you can still get your account back.
Even more amazing is that the recovery process does not compromise security in any way.
It only adds security to the network.
There is no added attack vector for the recovery account to steal your account.
It's actually quite genius when you look under the hood.
Like many others here, I've seen this variable dozens of times. I always assumed it meant my account had never been reset. I always assumed if one day I needed to recover my account that this reset variable would just store the date that my account was recovered or something like that.
Turns out my reset account being set to 
So yeah I was snooping around on the dsteem API the other day and stumbled across this:
What does the reset_account_operation do?
Clearly it should say reset_account and not recovery_account.
If this was true it would mean that any account that goes inactive for 60 days could be stolen by the recovery account... that doesn't sound right.
However when I check the official condenser API documentation (not dsteem) it says the same damn thing. Is this really a typo or can the recovery_account actually change the owner key of 60+ day inactive accounts.
This would have insane ramifications to the platform,
the biggest glaring one relating to the 
If the recovery account really can act as the reset account, this implies that Steemit Inc has access to these funds and can simply change the owner key of 
Still, I have to assume that this documentation is incorrect,
but I will still have to test it myself with my alt accounts.
Do you guys remember this post? I discussed in depth why it would be so cool to create multiple accounts with the same master key so if anyone loses their keys you could recover it for them easily.
This reset_account feature blows that idea out of the water. All one has to do is change the reset_account from
Seriously, go check https://hivebuzz.me/ranking
| Account | reset_account |
|---|---|
 | |
 | |
| |
 | |
 | |
 | |
 | |
 | |
 | |
 | |
This is fucking mind-blowing.
This is free security!
Wouldn't it be nice if someone you trust could recover your account?
Maybe even the lawyer handling your estate in such an event?
What if you simply lose your keys for whatever reason?
Let's say the documentation is not a typo, and in the event of the reset_account being
This would actually be really bad, because there is an attack vector here that no one is talking about. It would obviously be much smarter for the recovery_account and the reset_account to be different accounts. This way if the reset_account stole the account in question after 60 days, the true owner could still recover said account with the help of the recovery_account.
I can think of a few reasons. The main one is that a recovery account is a feature that only adds security. The reset_account provides an attack vector to steal accounts that go inactive. This would be an obvious reason to not use reset accounts.
Another reason not to use them would be because if Steemit Inc set themselves as the reset account, they could theoretically become liable for the accounts that went inactive. Technically those accounts would fall under their control, and the legality of certain situations resulting from that dynamic would be highly questionable.
I'm learning more about Hive every day.
It's pretty crazy.
We've all been told that accounts can not be recovered if you lose the keys.
Apparently, even this is a lie.
With reset accounts, we actually can recover accounts that lost their keys.
And no one seems to be using this feature... mind blowing.
I'll be testing this more in the days to come.
